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Background: In the context of the current coronavirus disease 2019 
(COVID-19) pandemic, understanding household transmission of 
seasonal coronaviruses may inform pandemic control. We aimed to 
investigate what proportion of seasonal coronavirus transmission 
occurred within households, measure the risk of transmission in 
households, and describe the impact of household-related factors of 
risk of transmission. 
Methods: Using data from three winter seasons of the UK Flu Watch 
cohort study, we measured the proportion of symptomatic infections 
acquired outside and within the home, the household transmission 
risk and the household secondary attack risk for PCR-confirmed 
seasonal coronaviruses. We present transmission risk stratified by 
demographic features of households. 
Results: We estimated that the proportion of cases acquired outside 
the home, weighted by age and region, was 90.7% (95% CI 84.6- 94.5, 
n=173/195) and within the home was 9.3% (5.5-15.4, 22/195). 
Following a symptomatic coronavirus index case, 14.9% (9.8 - 22.1, 
20/134) of households experienced symptomatic transmission to at 
least one other household member. Onward transmission risk ranged 
from 11.90% (4.84-26.36, 5/42) to 19.44% (9.21-36.49, 7/36) by strain. 
The overall household secondary attack risk for symptomatic cases 
was 8.00% (5.31-11.88, 22/275), ranging across strains from 5.10 (2.11-
11.84, 5/98) to 10.14 (4.82- 20.11, 7/69). Median clinical onset serial 
interval was 7 days (IQR= 6-9.5). Households including older adults, 3+ 
children, current smokers, contacts with chronic health conditions, 
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and those in relatively deprived areas had the highest transmission 
risks. Child index cases and male index cases demonstrated the 
highest transmission risks. 
Conclusion: Most seasonal coronaviruses appear to be acquired 
outside the household, with relatively modest risk of onward 
transmission within households. Transmission risk following an index 
case appears to vary by demographic household features, with 
potential overlap between those demonstrating the highest point 
estimates for seasonal coronavirus transmission risk and COVID-19 
susceptibility and poor illness outcomes.
Keywords 
coronavirus, HCoV-NL63, HCoV-OC43, HCoV-229E, SARS-CoV-2, 
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Background
Understanding household transmission parameters is important 
for outbreak modelling and response as coronavirus disease 
2019 (COVID-19) becomes established in communities 
worldwide. While studies are currently underway, developing 
robust estimates for household transmission parameters will 
take some time. Evidence from other human coronaviruses may 
therefore be useful, given similar routes of transmission1,2.
Outbreaks of other emerging coronaviruses, i.e. severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS) and Middle East respiratory 
syndrome (MERS), appear to be primarily based in health 
care settings without substantial community transmission 
and household transmission studies are limited. Estimates of 
transmission risk to at least one other household member 
following a SARS index case range from 12.3%–13.5%, 
with estimated secondary household attack risks between 
4.6%–10.2%3–5. In index cases, younger age and healthcare 
worker status were associated with lower risk of household 
transmission. A single study of MERS found that 44% of 
households with an index case experienced onwards trans-
mission, with a secondary attack risk of 24% and risk factors 
for developing secondary infection in contacts including being 
adult, male, and having long-term conditions6. 
Seasonal coronavirus infections also appear to cluster within 
households7, with proportions of onwards transmission to 
at least one household member following child index cases 
ranging between 8% and 33%8,9. A recent community cohort 
study based in Michigan10 found secondary attack risks rang-
ing from 7.2%–12.6% for circulating seasonal coronavirus 
strains and clinical-onset serial intervals between 3.2–3.6 days.
Here we aimed to report key characteristics of seasonal 
coronavirus household transmission in a population-based 
UK cohort, using data from the Flu Watch study11. We present 
the proportion of laboratory-confirmed seasonal coronavirus 
infections acquired within and outside the household, the 
household transmission risk and secondary attack risk for 
symptomatic cases, the clinical-onset serial interval, and 
transmission risk stratified by demographic household features.
Method
Study design and procedures
Data were drawn from the Flu Watch prospective cohort study 
of acute respiratory infections in English households11. We 
included the three winter seasons (2006–2007, 2007–2008, 
2008–2009), during which all samples were systematically 
tested for coronaviruses. The Flu Watch study methodology and 
cohort profile are described in detail elsewhere11,12.
Whole households were recruited annually to the study 
following random selection of a household member from GP 
practice lists. From 2008–2009, participants from the previ-
ous cohort were also re-invited to participate. Inclusion criteria 
were that all household members agreed to participate, and all 
members over 16 agreed to provide blood samples for other 
Flu Watch research. Exclusion criteria were household size 
>6 members, severely incapacitating or terminal illness in any 
household member, and heavy involvement in other research12. 
Participants provided demographic data at seasonal baseline 
following recruitment, and were followed-up weekly via tele-
phone or online throughout each season to report any symptoms 
of acute respiratory infection. If participants experienced any 
symptoms, they were requested to provide a nasal swab on the 
second day of illness and to provide a daily diary of symptoms 
from the first day of illness until the symptoms resolved. Real-
time PCR was carried out to screen nasal swabs for a panel of 
viruses, including three circulating seasonal coronavirus strains 
(229-E, NL63, and OC43)11.
Definitions and analyses
Guided by an estimated incubation period of 2–5 days and 
further 2–18 days of symptomatic illness with viral shedding 
for seasonal coronaviruses13,14, we defined index cases as the 
first PCR-confirmed infection in a household or >23-days 
following a prior case, co-primary cases as potential index 
cases of the same strain arising within ≤2 days, and secondary 
cases as infections with the same strain occurring >2 days and 
≤23 days from exposure to the index case(s). We assumed that 
household transmission to any secondary cases had occurred 
if the strain was unknown, but criteria for transmission were 
otherwise met. 
We estimated the proportions of total PCR-confirmed coro-
navirus cases in the study likely acquired in the community 
(i.e. index, co-primary, or single-person household cases) and 
acquired in the household (i.e. secondary cases). The propor-
tions were weighted to the English national structure of age and 
region11.
For households in which secondary transmission was possible 
(i.e. excluding single-person households and episodes of 
co-primary infection affecting all household members), we 
calculated the symptomatic household transmission risk– the 
proportion of households that experienced at least one sec-
ondary case – and the household secondary attack risk – the 
proportion of total exposed participants who became secondary 
cases. To avoid multiple inclusions of the same episode where 
there were co-primary cases, transmission risk and secondary 
attack risk were estimated based on a randomly-selected single 
index case. Due to the testing protocol, it was not possible to 
detect asymptomatic primary or secondary cases. We calculated 
the clinical-onset serial interval as the time in days from onset 
of reported symptoms in the index case(s) to onset of reported 
symptoms of the secondary case(s). All co-primary or multiple 
secondary cases in this cohort reported symptom onset on the 
same day.
We stratified the household symptomatic transmission risk 
by the following household features potentially relevant to 
transmission: the age structure of the household (adults between 
16–64 only, older adult(s), adult(s) and children), age of index 
case (child <16, adult 16-64, older adult 65+) for households 
with children (not stratified for other household structures due to 
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limited variation), the number of people and number of children 
in the household, whether the household contained current 
smoker(s), index of multiple deprivation, long-term health 
conditions in household contact(s), and the index sex, index 
healthcare worker status and index transmission-preventive 
hygiene behaviour. Index case hygiene behaviour was classi-
fied as a binary variable according to adherence to prevention 
guidelines15,16 i.e. covering the mouth while coughing or sneez-
ing, using a single-use tissue, and washing the hands habitually 
after coughing or sneezing and at least moderately-frequently 
throughout the day (>=5 times according to median split and 
previous literature17). Due to the small number of household 
transmissions, we present descriptive stratified analyses only 
and do not describe by strain sub-groups. Where features of 
the index case or index-exposed dyads were investigated, we 
included only those households where there was a clear index 
case rather than co-primary cases. Any instances of missing 
demographic data are noted in Table 1.









Adults only 9.09 (3.38, 22.21) 4 (20.00) 40 (35.09)
Older adult(s) 25.00 (10.47, 48.73) 5 (25.00) 15 (13.16)
Adult(s) and child(ren) 15.71 (8.84, 26.40) 11 (55.00) 59 (51.75)
Number of children
0 14.06 (7.40, 25.10) 9 (45.00) 55 (48.25)
1 0.00 (n/a) 0 (0.00) 27 (23.68)
2 21.88 (10.60, 39.80) 7 (35.00) 25 (21.93)
3+ 36.36 (13.47, 67.71) 4 (20.00) 7 (6.14)
Smoker(s) in householda
Yes 28.57 (10.61, 57.42) 4 (22.22) 10 (9.52)
No 12.84 (7.70, 20.66) 14 (77.78) 95 (90.48)
IMD
1-2 (lower) 23.08 (10.50, 43.41) 6 (30.00) 20 (17.55)
3 12.20 (5.07, 26.53) 5 (25.00) 36 (31.58)
4 13.89 (5.78, 29.78) 5 (25.00) 31 (27.19)
5 (higher) 12.90 (4.80, 30.32) 4 (20.00) 27 (23.68)
Contact(s) with chronic conditionb
Yes 16.67 (7.54, 32.92) 6 (33.33) 30 (27.03)
No 12.90 (7.41, 21.51) 12 (66.67) 81 (72.97)
Index age* (households with children)
Adult 12.90 (4.75, 30.58) 4 (44.44) 27 (52.94)
Child 17.24 (7.11, 36.10) 5 (55.56) 24 (47.06)
Index healthcare worker*
Yes 0.00 (n/a) 0 (0.00) 7 (6.60)
No 15.38 (9.85, 23.23) 18 (100.00) 99 (93.40)
Index hygiene* c
Yes (all recommendations) 0 (n/a) 0 (0.00) 13 (12.87)
No 16.98 (10.89, 25.50) 18 (100.00) 88 (87.13)
Index sex*
Male 18.46 (10.69, 29.99) 12 (66.67) 53 (50.00)
Female 10.17 (4.57, 21.11) 6 (33.33) 53 (50.00)
* outbreaks with clear index case only (n=10 outbreaks with co-primaries excluded); a unavailable for 
n=11 outbreaks; b unavailable for n=5 outbreaks; c unavailable for n=5 outbreaks; abbreviations: 
CI = confidence interval, IMD = indices of multiple deprivation.
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Table 2. Community and household-acquired infections and features of household transmission.
229E NL63 OC43 All*
Infections acquired in 
community:  
% (95% CI, n/N)
87.85 (73.40-94.99, 45/52) 93.82 (81.88-98.08, 55/60) 89.41 (77.91-95.29, 70/80) 90.66 (84.60- 94.49, 173/195)
Infections acquired in 
household:  
% (95% CI, n/N)
12.15 (5.01-26.60, 7/52) 6.18 (1.92-18.12, 5/60) 10.59 (4.71-22.09, 10/80) 9.34 (5.51-15.40, 22/195)
Household transmission 
risk: % (95% CI, n/N)
19.44 (9.21-36.49, 7/36) 11.90 (4.84-26.36, 5/42) 13.21 (6.27-25.72, 7/53) 14.93 (9.78-22.11, 20/134)
Secondary attack risk:  
% (95% CI, n/N)
10.14 (4.82- 20.11, 7/69) 5.10 (2.11-11.84, 5/98) 8.73 (4.56-16.10, 9/103) 8.00 (5.31-11.88, 22/275)**
Serial interval (days): Mdn  
(IQR, range)
7.0 (6.0-21.0, 5.0-21.0) 7.0 (6.0-7.5, 6.0-8.0) 6.5 (6-8.75, 6.0-14.0) 7.0 (6.0-9.5, 5.0-21.0)
*All strains include cases where strain was unknown (n=3); **due to unknown index strain, n=5 exposed contacts were included with no outbreak strain 
recorded.
To estimate potential non-detection of household transmis-
sions due to non-adherence to swabbing protocol, we measured 
the proportion of exposed participants who reported symptoms 
within one month of an index case but did not submit a nasal 
swab. Analyses were performed in Stata Version 15.
Results
Proportion of infections acquired in the households and 
features of transmission
Table 2 reports the proportion of infections acquired within and 
outside of the household and the symptomatic transmission 
risk, secondary attack risk, and clinical-onset serial interval by 
strain and overall.
There were a total of 195 coronavirus cases during the three 
seasons in households in which transmission was possible, of 
which a weighted proportion of 90.66% (95% CI 84.60-94.49, 
173/195) were index or co-primary cases presumably acquired 
in the community, and 9.34% (5.51-15.40, 22/195) were in 
exposed household members and presumed to be acquired 
through household transmission. The proportion of presumed 
household-acquired infections ranged across strains from 
6.18% (1.92-18.12, 5/60) for NL63, to 10.59% (4.71-22.09, 10/80) 
for OC43, and 12.15% (5.01-26.60, 7/52) for 229E. Strain data 
was unavailable for three cases.
There were 134 potential household outbreaks with a coronavirus 
index case or co-primary cases. All 22 co-primary cases 
from 10 households occurred on the same day. Of the 134 
potential outbreaks, 22 had transmission to at least one other 
household member giving an overall household transmission 
risk of 14.93% (95% CI: 9.78-22.11). Across strains, household 
transmission risk ranged from 11.90% (4.84-26.36, 5/42) 
for NL63, 13.21% (6.27-25.72, 7/53) for OC43, and 19.44% 
(9.21-36.49, 7/36) for 229E.
A total of 22 exposed participants contracted a coronavirus 
infection, out of 275 participants at risk (excluding index and 
co-primary cases), yielding a household secondary attack risk 
of 8.00% (95% CI: 5.31-11.88, 22/275) overall. Secondary 
attack risks by strain were 5.10% (2.11-11.84, 5/98) for NL63, 
8.73% (4.56-16.10, 9/103) for OC43, and 10.14% (4.82-20.11, 
7/69) for 229E. Due to unknown index strain, outbreak strain 
was unavailable for five exposed participants.
The median clinical-onset serial interval was 7 days (IQR 
= 6-9.5 days, range 5-21 days). This median value was 
consistent for 229E and NL63, with some between-strain 
variation in range, and similar to the OC43 median serial 
interval of  6.5 days. There were two households for which the 
exact date of symptom onset of the exposed case could not be 
traced (only the beginning date of the week of illness), which were 
excluded from the serial interval calculation.
Demographic features and transmission Risk
Table 1 reports household symptomatic transmission risk 
stratified by demographic features of households. Transmission 
risks were highest for households containing older adults 
(25.00%, 95% CI 10.47, 48.73), households with children 
(15.71%; 8.84, 26.40), then adult-only households (9.09%; 
3.38, 22.21). Households with 3+ children (36.36%; 13.34, 
67.96), those with smokers (28.57%; 10.61, 57.42), those in 
deprived areas (23.08%; 10.50, 43.41), and those in which 1+ 
household contact had a chronic health condition (16.67%; 7.54, 
21.51) had the highest transmission risks within their categories. 
In households with children, child index cases demonstrated 
higher transmission risk (17.24%; 7.11, 36.10) than adult index 
cases (12.90%; 4.75, 30.58). Male index cases also demonstrated 
higher transmission risk (18.46; 10.69, 29.99) than female index 
cases (10.17%; 4.57, 21.11). There was no evidence of onward 
transmission if the index case was a healthcare worker or if 
they practiced good hand and respiratory hygiene, though the 
number of index cases in these categories were low (n= 7 and 13 
respectively).
Adherence to swabbing protocol during household 
outbreaks
Among the 275 exposed household members, there were 75 
distinct episodes of respiratory symptoms within 23 days of 
a household coronavirus index case. For 4 of these episodes 
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(5.33%), the participant did not provide a swab at any point during 
their illness.
Discussion
The study describes a range of important characteristics of 
seasonal coronavirus transmission that have not previously 
been reported. The great majority of infections (91%) were 
acquired outside the household. Following a symptomatic index 
case within the household, onward transmission to at least one 
other household member occurred in 14.9% of households, with 
a secondary attack risk of 8.0%. Risk of onwards household 
transmission fell within previous estimates for seasonal 
coronaviruses8,9 and were higher than the limited literature 
suggests for SARS3–5, but lower than for MERS6. The second-
ary attack risk fell within the range identified for seasonal 
coronavirus strains in a recent US-based longitudinal cohort 
study10 and was somewhat lower than preliminary estimates of 
the household secondary attack risk for COVID-19 - ranging 
between 10.5% in USA18, 13.6% in Taiwan19; 14.9% in Shenzen, 
China20, and 31.6% in Zhejiang Province, China21. Our estimate 
for the median clinical-onset serial interval (7 days) was larger 
than Monto et al.’s (2020) estimate10 (3.2-3.6 days), though this 
may reflect different handling of potentially co-primary cases, 
as only an upper-bound distance between cases was specified 
in the latter study. 
Since the virus causing COVID-19 is a recently emerged 
pathogen there is likely to be minimal population immunity, this 
contrasts with seasonal coronaviruses, where results from the 
Flu Watch study show a protective effect of recent infection22. 
This may contribute to higher household secondary attack 
risk in COVID-19 than in seasonal coronavirus. Given emerg-
ing evidence that some individuals with asymptomatic 
or pre-symptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infections may be capable of 
transmitting the virus to others23–26, preventing household 
transmission of SARS-CoV-2 may be notably challenging. 
Recent COVID-19 household transmission studies have 
also occurred during periods when there have been stringent 
measures to control transmission. Intensified hand and 
respiratory and environmental cleaning during a pandemic may 
decrease household transmission. Measures that ensure families 
stay at home together may increase household secondary 
attack risk by increasing the level of contact in the home. In 
the current study the majority of infections were acquired 
outside the household. The proportion of infections acquired 
outside the household is likely to be lower during periods of 
social distancing27. We have previously shown that conduct-
ing a wide range of activities outside the household, including 
visiting supermarkets, shops, restaurants, places of worship 
and using public transport, increase the risk of acquiring acute 
respiratory infection28.
Demographic and health-related characteristics with the highest 
point estimates for symptomatic transmission risk overlapped 
with risk groups for susceptibility and/or poor outcomes in 
COVID-19, namely households comprising older adults, current 
smokers, exposed members with chronic illness, and those in 
deprived areas29–31. Although children had a higher point estimate 
for transmission risk, index cases were distributed relatively 
evenly across age groups, in contrast with a Michigan com-
munity cohort study in which children comprised the majority 
of index cases for most strains10. Good hand and respiratory 
hygiene by index cases may be helpful for disrupting transmis-
sion, possibly overlapping with the lack onwards transmission 
from healthcare workers. The findings should be interpreted 
with caution given relatively small numbers of positive transmis-
sions and, related, wide confidence intervals for transmission 
risk estimates. We were underpowered to conduct multivariate 
analysis required to disentangle the interrelationships between 
potential demographic and health-related risk factors and this 
is a relevant area for further research concerning seasonal and 
pandemic coronaviruses.
This study had a number of limitations. Data were limited to 
winter seasons. Only symptomatic cases were swabbed and 
detected. While there appeared to be good adherence to the 
swabbing protocol among household members exposed to an 
index case, five percent of those who developed symptoms 
following exposure failing to provide a swab so secondary trans-
mission may be underestimated. It is possible that the nasal 
swabbing protocol, which was developed primarily for influenza 
detection, did not provide ideal sensitivity for these strains of 
coronavirus. We also cannot exclude that index cases in the 
initial weeks of the study could have acquired the case through 
undetected household transmission. The analyses did not 
account for background rate of infection in the community and 
consequently some apparent secondary cases may have been 
acquired incidentally outside of the household. All risk factor 
analyses were limited by a relatively small number of onward 
transmissions.
To our knowledge, this study presents the first investigation 
into household transmission in seasonal coronaviruses in a 
population-based UK sample. In typical winter seasons with 
individuals freely able to continue typical activities and 
social contacts, household transmission appears to be lower 
than in COVID-19. However, this difference may reflect 
different levels of population immunity and behaviours rather 
than intrinsic differences in the transmissibility of seasonal 
coronaviruses and the pandemic strain. The high proportion 
of infections acquired outside the household reinforces Stay 
at Home messages. Corresponding population-based studies 
investigating COVID-19 household transmission - such as the 
UK Virus Watch study, modelled on the Flu Watch study used 
here - are warranted to inform transmission models and public 
health interventions. 
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This project contains the following underlying data:
-     Household_CoV_acquired.csv (data required to compute 
the proportion of cases presumably acquired outside 
of the household versus and the proportion acquired 
from household transmission. Each row represents an 
anonymised PCR-confirmed seasonal coronavirus case)
-     Household_CoV_acquired.dta (above data file in .dta 
format)
-     Household_CoV_TransmissionRisk.csv (data required 
to compute the risk of symptomatic onward household 
transmission following a seasonal coronavirus index case, 
and perform stratified descriptive analyses)
-     Household_CoV_TransmissionRisk.csv (above data file 
in .dta format)
-     Household_CoV_SAR.csv (data required to compute the 
seasonal coronavirus secondary attack risk overall and by 
strain. Each row represents an anonymised exposed-index 
pair from a given outbreak)
-     Household_CoV_SAR.dta (above data file in .dta 
format)
-     HH Transmission Serial Interval.csv (presents available, 
anonymised data required to compute the median clinical-
onset serial interval overall and by strain for each household 
outbreak)
Data are available under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International license (CC-BY 4.0).
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Brief Summary:  
This is a well-written and timely article on household transmission of seasonal coronaviruses with 
implications for the current pandemic. This presents original work using a population-based 
cohort in England which has previously been described. This prospective cohort was contacted 
weekly during the winter season, which is when seasonal coronaviruses circulate. Symptomatic 
participants in each household kept a daily log of symptoms allowing for granular data collection. 
PCR and strain level characterization of coronavirus diagnoses were included which was a major 
strength. Household transmission risk is presented and stratified by relevant characteristics 
including household structure, number of children, smoking, and hygiene. The findings include 
description of clinical serial interval, secondary attack risk, and household transmission risk 
stratified by strain type. The comparison of this study’s household attack rates to other 
coronaviruses (including SARS and MERS) is very valuable and adds to the cogwheel of data 
informing household transmission of COVID-19. The authors do a good job of noting caution in 
interpretation of results given that the risk factor section is underpowered with overlapping 
confidence intervals. 
  
Major Concerns:  
A particularly interesting result is the increased risk of transmission among males, households 
with older adults, smokers, and chronic illnesses which is also seen as risk factors for severe 
disease in COVID-19. But looking at Table 1, it is difficult to know if these trends are statistically 
significant given the overlapping confidence intervals. Additionally, for “older adults in the 
household” it is unclear whether this may simply be a proxy for more individuals in a household or 
for having children in the household (such as a multigenerational family). The limitation of wide 
confidence intervals is raised in the discussion section, but this potential relationship also appears 
in the abstract conclusion as a major finding. Given that there are so many caveats and need for 
further work in this area, I suggest removing the finding from the abstract and keep it described 
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with all the caveats in the discussion section. The fact that there were no household transmission 
when the index case followed hand and respiratory hygiene protocols seems to be a really 
important data point and finding of the study to highlight. 
  
Minor Concerns:
Please define “deprived areas” or IMD (indices of multiple deprivation) used in Table 1 and 
comments in the discussion (bottom left paragraph) in the methods section. 
 
1. 
In the methods section, the inability to identify asymptomatic primary or secondary cases is 
raised. It would be helpful to include this limitation in the discussion section and provide 
any underlying literature on asymptomatic transmission of seasonal coronaviruses. This is 




One of the strengths of the paper is the description of strains, but the discussion does not 
include any background on known differences or comments/hypotheses regarding whether 
strain type may play a role in household transmission risk. 
 
3. 
When discussing “households with older adults”, does this also include children and could 
this simply be a proxy for more people in the household? 
 
4. 
It may be valuable to discuss possible background immunity to common hCoVs a bit more 
in the discussion, and its possible impact on household transmission findings. This is where 
there is also a big difference between the common hCoVs and SARS-CoV-2. Authors allude 
to this throughout, but it may benefit from some attention in the discussion section.
5. 
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Are all the source data underlying the results available to ensure full reproducibility?
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Are the conclusions drawn adequately supported by the results?
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investigations.
We confirm that we have read this submission and believe that we have an appropriate level 
of expertise to confirm that it is of an acceptable scientific standard.
Reviewer Report 25 January 2021
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© 2021 Rolfes M. This is an open access peer review report distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the 
original work is properly cited.
Melissa Rolfes  
Influenza Division, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA 
The authors provide a report on seasonal coronavirus infections detected in the Flu Watch cohort 
in the UK and examine household and demographic features associated with subsequent infection 
in other household members. In general, the rationale and implications of the study are clearly 
described and further elaboration of the methods and results would strengthen the manuscript 
overall. This is important work for the public health community, grappling with the ongoing SARS-
CoV-2 pandemic; however, one limitation of the Flu Watch study, and its conclusions and relevance 
for the current pandemic, are that all detected infections were symptomatic because only 
symptomatic participants contributed nasal swab specimens for PCR testing. I look forward to 
further studies that can build on this study design to innovatively capture asymptomatic seasonal 
respiratory virus infections to better understand the drivers behind onward transmission. 
 
Specific comments that I hope the authors can address in the next version are below. 
 
Major comments
Please include further description of the weekly telephone/internet survey, including the list 
of symptoms that were asked about. The description should include enough detail to 
answer the following questions: Was the question addressed to one member of the 
household or did each member have to respond about symptoms? Was the list of 
symptoms different if the participant was a young child (and below what age were these 
different symptoms solicited)? 
 
○
The methods section did not include a definition of the indices of multiple deprivation. A 
short description of what the indices are based on would be important for re-creating this 
work and analysis. Additionally, a reference to the index would be helpful for readers. 
 
○
Please include the method you used to estimate the confidence intervals for the household 
transmission risk, the symptomatic secondary transmission risk, and the community 
infection risk…well, all really. 
 
○
The results section could be elaborated with more information about the cohort size. How 
many people (and how many households) participated in each season? What were the 
○
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demographic, household, geographic, and socioeconomic characteristics of the 
participants? 
 
In the 3rd paragraph of the results section, the authors state that 22 households had 
transmission (out of a possible 134) = 16.42% household transmission risk. But in Table 2, 
the number is 20 out of a possible 134 = 14.93%. Please make the appropriate corrections in 
the table and text. 
 
○
The literature on household transmission of SARS-CoV-2 is moving quickly, but it’d be useful 
to update the Discussion section and references to include more recent estimates of 
household secondary transmission risk for SARS-CoV-2.
○
Minor comments
The authors appropriately use the term “symptomatic transmission risk”, but perhaps the 
authors could consider modifying their title to further remind readers. Something like 
“Household transmission of symptomatic coronavirus infections: …” 
 
○
To avoid including both co-primary cases in the analysis, the authors chose a randomly-
selected case to serve as the “primary”/index case. Can you include in the discussion 
whether or not your findings (particularly the risk %s in Table 1) were sensitive to this 
random draw? Effectively what you’re doing is imputing who the primary case was in the 
household, but you’ve done the imputation once in the current analysis. You could do the 
imputation multiple times (10-15 times, for example) and then summarize the transmission 
risks that you get in each of those iterations (just like you would in a multiple imputation). 
This approach might be more robust to chance findings, especially since there were quite a 
few co-primary cases. 
 
○
I appreciate the importance of weighting the infection proportions for your sampling 
scheme and to the underlying population. In Table 1 and 2, though, it would have been 
helpful to have a reminder of which proportions were weighted to the underlying 
population and which ones were not. I believe you’d be able to weight the first two rows, 
but not the others; however, you’d know best. A footnote would suffice to me.
○
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If applicable, is the statistical analysis and its interpretation appropriate?
Yes
Are all the source data underlying the results available to ensure full reproducibility?
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Are the conclusions drawn adequately supported by the results?
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Competing Interests: No competing interests were disclosed.
Reviewer Expertise: Epidemiologic methods, epidemiology of influenza and other respiratory 
viruses, household transmission.
I confirm that I have read this submission and believe that I have an appropriate level of 
expertise to confirm that it is of an acceptable scientific standard, however I have 
significant reservations, as outlined above.
Reviewer Report 29 October 2020
https://doi.org/10.21956/wellcomeopenres.17611.r40663
© 2020 Kenah E. This is an open access peer review report distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the 
original work is properly cited.
Eben Kenah   
Department of Biostatistics, School of Public Health, Ohio State University, Columbus, USA 
This is a fascinating study of the household transmission of seasonal coronavirus infections in a 
well-described and well-run cohort study. The associations between transmission risk and the age 
of household members, number of children, male primary cases, primary case hygiene, smoking, 
and deprivation are all plausible and may be useful for thinking about the transmission of COVID-
19. There are far too few studies of this kind, so this one is useful both for its own results and as 
an example for others. The paper is clearly written, and the data analyses are simple but 
thoughtful. My major comments are
The methods used to calculate confidence intervals should be described more clearly, and 
confidence intervals (e.g., exact confidence intervals) should be given even when no onward 
transmission was observed. 
 
○
The limitations are adequately discussed with one exception: the methods implicitly assume 
that all secondary cases are infected by the primary case. Because it neglects multiple 
generations of transmission within the household.
○
Additional minor comments are listed below:
I appreciate the consistent use of "secondary attack risk''. 
 
1. 
In line with the usage recommended by Giesecke (2014)1, it might be better to use "primary 
case'' instead of "index case'' for the first person infected in the household. This would also 
be more consistent with the use of "co-primary'' throughout the manuscript. 
 
2. 
(page~4, Table~1) Exact confidence intervals can be given for household groups in which 
there were no observed transmissions. 
 
3. 
(page~5, bottom or right column) It would be more accurate to say that no observed 4. 
 
Page 13 of 14
Wellcome Open Research 2020, 5:145 Last updated: 29 JAN 2021
onward transmission if the primary case was a healthcare worker or if they practiced good 
hand and respiratory hygiene. 
 
The methods used to calculate confidence intervals need to be explained more clearly. 
When I try to replicate them, I get similar results but not exact matches. 
 
5. 
Given the uncertainty in the point and interval estimates, a single decimal point in the 
percentages is probably sufficient. 
 
6. 
One other limitation needs to be mentioned: The method of calculating the secondary 
attack risk implicitly assumes that all secondary cases are infected by the primary case, 
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